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AN OUNCE OF DISCRETION FOR A POUND OF FLESH: A
SUGGESTED REFORM FOR USURY LAWS
GENERAL usury laws are an ineffective and troublesome anachronism, a
lingering product of the medieval "fair price" doctrine perpetuated by the
deeply ingrained antipathy to the moneylender.' In force in all but four states,
2
these statutes prohibit parties from contracting for any loan with an interest
rate in excess of specified maximums, ranging from six per cent to twelve
per cent per annum.3 Penalties against the usurious lender range from for-
feiture of the entire principal and interest to forfeiture of only that portion of
the interest in excess of the statutory maximum.4 As a result of narrow
judicial construction of the term "loan," only a limited number of debtor-
creditor relationships remain within the scope of these laws. And because of
similar restrictions imposed on the definition of the term "interest," not all
charges made in loan transactions are subject to the test of usury.,
Popularly supposed to be necessary primarily to protect the small consumer
borrower, usury laws have been replaced for the most part in this field by
consumer loan legislation. The narrow definitions of "loan" and "interest"
made evasion of the statutes easy, and the small borrower was generally un-
aware of his rights and often lacked the means to enforce them.6 Moreover,
the limitations imposed on interest rates by usury statutes were so unrealistic
as to invite evasion; risks encountered on small consumer loans far exceeded
maximum interest rates.7 Recognition of these shortcomings led to wide-
1. See, generally, RYAN, UsuRy AND USURY LAws 35-57 (1924). The continued
vitality of the irrational attitudes which have perpetuated these statutes is demonstrated
in two recent articles which approved the Arkansas Supreme Court's invalidation of the
state's small loan law on constitutional grounds. Collins & Ham, The Usury Law of
Arkansas: A Study in Evasion, 8 ARK. L. REv. 399 (1954); Penick, The Impact of Usury
Law on Banks in Arkansas, 8 id. at 420. See Strickler v. State Auto Finance Co., 220
Ark. 565, 249 S.W.2d 307 (1952) ; Winston v. Personal Finance Co., 220 Ark. 580, 249
S.W.2d 315 (1952).
2. faine, 'Massachusetts and New Hampshire have no statutes limiting the interest
rates which may be agreed upon by the parties. By statute Colorado specifically permits
parties to agree on any interest rate, provided it is put in writing. CoLO. REv. STAT. c. 73,
art. 1, § 3 (1953). For compilation of state statutes see Penick, supra note 1, at 428-31;
Horack, A Survey of the General Usury Laws, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 36 (1941).
3. Rhode Island allows rates of up to 30% per annum. RI. GEN. LAws c. 485, § 2
(1938). For compilation and tabulation of the various statutes, see Penick, supra note 1,
at 428-31; Horack, supra note 2.
4. Penick, supra note 1; Horack, supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Phares, 70 Okla. 255, 174 Pac. 519 (1918) ; C. C.
Slaughter Co. v. Eller, 196 S.W. 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) ; Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wash.
2d 378, 156 P.2d 408 (1945) ; Collins, Evasion and Avoidance of Usury Laws, 8 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 54 (1941).
6. Bogert, Future of Small Loan Legislation, 12 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1944).
7. Ibid.
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spread enactment of the Uniform Small Loan Law,3 covering loans under
$500, and the recent but rapid development of a pattern of installment loan
legislation covering loans up to $5,000. 9 These laws permit licensed lenders
to charge rates of interest substantially higher than the usury maximums on
loans which comply with the detailed provisions of the statutes. They also
provide for close administrative investigation and supervision of all aspects
of the lender's business. These statutes have been successful in protecting
consumer borrowers and have facilitated the enormous growth of consumer
credit.10 It appears likely that other states will follow the lead of Indiana and
Missouri in extending the scope of these statutes and in integrating them into
a comprehensive consumer credit code which will cover all forms of install-
ment credit under $5,000.11 As a result of these developments, the scope of
general usury statutes has been increasingly restricted to the area of commer-
cial lending.
For loans outside the scope of consumer loan legislation, the protection
which usury statutes are intended to afford has been virtually eliminated by
statutory exemptions and the ease of evasion. Most important of the statutory
exemptions is the one granted by fifteen states, including nearly all the large
commercial and industrial states, to all loans made to corporations.' 2 In many
states there is no limitation on the interest rate which may be charged on
8. Effective laws, based on the Uniform Small Loan Law, have been enacted in all
but a dozen states. Kramer, Symposium, The Loan Shark Problem Today, 19 LAw &
CONThImp. PROD. 1 (1954). Several other states have small loan laws which are ineffective
either because the rates allowed are too low, see, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 5571-91
(1942), or an insufficient degree of regulation is provided for, see, e.g., Wyo. Comp. STAT.
ANN. §§ 39-1111 - 39-1112 (1945).
9. Thus the Morris Plan or Industrial Loan Banks, originally devised as a means
of evading the usury law by the sale of so-called "investment certificates" to every bor-
rower, have received statutory sanction in 29 states and have been put under some degree
of regulation. Sixteen states have some regulation of sales financing and most of the
states require licensing for sales finance companies. A few of these stdtes set maximum
permissible finance charges. And 20 states now have laws authoring banks to make
installment loans at interest rates above the usury maximums. S, generally, Hubachek,
Progress and Problems in Regulation of Consumer Credit, 19 .Aw & CONTEIMIP. P oB. 4
(1954); Hubachek, The Drift toward a Consumcr Credit Code, 16 U. Cui. L. REv. 609
(1949).
10. See articles cited note 9 supra.
11. See IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 19-2201 - 19-2206, 18-3001 - 18-3125, 58-901 - 53-934 (Burns
1950); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 367.100 - 367.200, 408.100 - 408.220 (Vernon 1952).
12. DEL. CoDE ANn. tit. 6, § 2306 (1953) ; ILL.-Axx. STAT. c. 32, §§ 4-6 (1954) ; IND.
ANN. STAT. § 19-2001 (Burns 1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 17-4103 (1949); ID. ANN.
CODE GEN. LAWS art. 23, § 121 (1952) ; Mic. STAT. ANN. § 21.78 (1937) ; MiNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 334.021 (West Supp. 1954); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 408.060 (Vernon 1952); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 31:1-6 (1940) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-2-34 (1954) ; N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 374;
PA. ST.AT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-313 (1938) ; VA. CoDE § 6-351 (1950) ; W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 4632 (1949) ; Wis. STAT. § 115.06 (1953).
The courts will generally refuse to pierce the corporate veil even where the debtor
incorporated solely for the purpose of obtaining the loan. E.g., Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N.Y.
319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930) ; Rabinowich v. Eliasberg, 159 Md. 655, 152 At. 437 (1930) ;
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corporate bonds,13 and a few states exempt loans over $5,000 secured by
commercial paper.' 4 Where no exemptions are available, the use of tie-in
sales, sales with an option to repurchase,' 5 and excessive "service" charges,
such as costs of credit investigations, 16 are common methods of evasion made
possible by the restrictive definitions of loan and interest.
Despite their general ineffectiveness the statutes do have the undesirable
effect of restricting the flow of commercial credit and creating a constant, if
petty, annoyance to the business community. The maximum rates are too low
to allow profitable lending in high-risk situations. Although in most instances
the usury statutes can be evaded, the added risk of incurring usury penalties
raises the cost of the loan to the borrower.' 7 Moreover, the reluctance of the
leading credit institutions to undertake both types of risk considerably limits
the available sources of such credit. The dilemma which thus confronts the
small businessman in need of a high-risk loan is either to shop for credit with
the protection of the usury laws and find none available, or to avoid the usury
statutes through incorporation and subject himself to the likelihood of a
usurious rate. Finally, the technicalities of these statutes can serve as traps
for the unwary though honest lender.18
Two alternatives for reform present themselves. The first is to repeal the
general usury statutes and allow complete freedom of contract in loan trans-
actions outside the scope of consumer loan legislation. The second is to re-
Silberman v. Cades, 107 N.J. Eq. 574, 153 Atl. 473 (Ct. Err. & App. 1931). See Note,
Usury, Inc.-Incorporation to Avoid Usury Laws, 7 MIAan L.Q. 375 (1953).
Last year a Queens County grand jury began an investigation of the use of the
corporate exemption to evade usury laws. It was alleged that 8,000 people had obtained
loans at interest rates of 45% to 60%, secured by second mortgages on their homes, from
so-called "funding corporations" which incorporated the borrower, usually without the
latter ever realizing what had been done. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1955, p. 1, col. 2.
13. See, e.g., Oma REv. STAT. § 82.120(4) (1953); N.C. GFIN. STAT. § 24-2 (1952).
14. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 1 (1954); N.Y. GEx. Bus. LAw § 379.
15. See 6 CoIWiN, CONTRACTs § 1501 (1951). Although the courts repeatedly state that
they will look through form to substance in determining whether there has been a loan in
fact, this has been more "rhetorical calisthenics than practical application." Comment, 6
ARK. L. REv. 26, 28 (1951).
16. See 6 CoRBIN, CONtRAcrs § 1502 (1951).
17. See 6 id. § 1499.
18. Such questions as whether or not the maximum rate can be discounted in advance
without violating the usury laws are answered differently by the various state's and may
easily trap a careless lender.
The classic example of a legitimate commercial lender suffering the harsh penalties of
the usury law through a misunderstanding of its technicalities is New York Dry Dock Bank
v. American Life Ins. and Trust Co., 3 N.Y. 344 (1849). The Dry Dock Bank, at a time
when its credit was impaired, negotiated a loan with a certain Englishman in London for
nearly $200,000. Interest of 6% per annum was agreed upon and a bonus was given which
raised the actual rate to slightly over 11% per annum. The Dry Dock Bank subsequently
refused to repay the loan on the grounds that it was usurious. The New York Court of
Appeals upheld this contention and the lender lost the entire principal and interest. This
case led to the exemption of corporations from the usury laws in New York and several
other states. RYAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 58.
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place the present fixed-rate test of usury with a standard enabling courts to
declare usurious those loans that are found to be harsh and unconscionable.
Repeal would leave the borrower without effective protection from usurious
loan contracts. There is still need to retain some protection for borrowers in
loan transactions outside the scope of consumer loan legislation. A high degree
of bargaining inequality exists in many large personal loans, and in loans to
ailing and high-risk enterprises. Generally forced to obtain their loans from
a limited group of lenders, and often in a position of borrow or perish, such
borrowers are easy prey for the unscrupulous lender. It is true that some
courts when faced with unconscionable contracts have given relief to the victi-
mized party by tortured readings of the contract terms 19 and findings of "con-
structive fraud," lack of mutuality, and ambiguity.20 Such relief is sporadic,
however, and often establishes embarrassing precedents. It is also conceivable
that usury laws could be replaced gradually by legislation covering specific
types of loans as the need for protection arises. However, it is difficult to see
how any meaningful classification is possible, and even if it were, this approach
would resurrect the same troublesome technicalities of application which
plague lenders under present statutes.
Adoption of a statute implementing the doctrine of unconscionability would
eliminate the restrictive effects of existing usury laws yet provide adequate
protection for borrowers not covered by consumer loan legislation. Such a
law should provide that: 1) any interest rate may be agreed to by the parties,
but courts may declare any loan transaction usurious where the interest rate
is excessive and the loan, taken as a whole, is harsh and unconscionable;
2) if a loan is usurious, the court may order forfeiture of any amount up to
perhaps double the interest charged; and 3) if the court finds the borrower's
defense groundless and the litigation vexatious it may award, in addition to
costs, a reasonable attorney's fee. This statute would give the courts a broad
power of review, unhampered by the present restrictive definitions of loan and
interest and the numerous statutory exemptions. By providing a flexible
standard of usury, a discretionary penalty for dealing with usurious lenders,
and a safeguard against vexatious or dilatory litigation by borrowers, such a
statute would go far towards removing the cobwebs from a neglected corner
of commercial law.
This reform would allow freedom of contract in loan transactions subject
only to a standard of good faith and fair dealing. American law has been
slowly drifting toward such a limitation on all contract dealings.21 And the
Uniform Commerical Code codifies this development for sales contracts by
providing that a court may set aside any term of a sales contract or the
19. E.g., New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. Spears, 194 Iowa 417, 189 N.W. 815 (1922);
Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927).
20. E.g., Weil v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 138 Ark. 534, 212 S.W. 313 (1919)
(lack of mutuality) ; Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 33 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E.
327 (1928) (vagueness and ambiguity) ; Planters Nat'l Bank v. E. G. Heflin Co., 166 Va.
166, 184 S.E. 216 (1936) (constructive fraud).




entire contract if it finds the contract "harsh and unconscionable. '22 Though
the section is apparently directed primarily at fine print clauses in order and
acceptance forms, the language of the section is general and is not limited in
any way to that specific problem..
2 3 -
A harsh and unconscionable standard has been successfully applied to loan
contracts by the English courts for half a century. The English Moneylenders
Act of 1900 provides that the courts may reopen any loan made by a profes-
sional moneylender and reduce the interest rate to what it considers a reason-
able rate if, in view of all the circumstances, the court finds the interest and
all other charges "excessive" and the terms of the loan "harsh and uncon-
scionable."'2 4 The English experience indicates that such a standard is a work-
able one which need not create undesirable uncertainty in loan transactions.
Recognizing the difficulty of determining whether a given interest rate is
excessive, the English courts have refused, except in a few extreme cases,2 5 to
find any loan harsh and unconscionable on the basis of a high rate of interest,
absent extrinsic evidence of bargaining inequality or trickery and sharp deal-
ing.20 Thus in the great majority of commercial loan situations, where neither
party has a great advantage in bargaining power, the courts will not interfere
with the judgment of the parties. On the other hand, evidence of overreach-
ing or a showing of great bargaining inequality will cause the courts to reopen
a loan even where the interest rate is not extraordinarily high.
2 7
In determining whether bargaining inequality existed or whether sharp
dealing occurred, the courts consider the entire transaction or series of
transactions between the parties.2 8 The age, sex and business experience of
the parties is considered.2 0 Usually a decisive factor is extreme need of the
borrower known to the lender. Any fraud on the part of the lender and,
short of fraud, any attempt to conceal the true rate of interest by confusing
and misleading methods of computing interest, particularly upon refinancing,
is relevant. In short, any action on the part of the lender which though not
fraudulent does not constitute fair dealing would, in conjunction with an ap-
22. U1IFOR11 COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
23. See Comment, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 146 (1950).
24. Moneylenders Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vicr., c. 51. The Act was amended in 1927
to provide for licensing of moneylenders and to require that the borrower be given a written
note or memorandum which clearly expresses the interest rate in a per cent per annum
and includes all terms of the loan. The amendments further provided that if the interest
rate were 48% per annum or more the lender had the burden of proving that the loan
was not harsh and unconscionable. Moneylenders Act, 1927, 17 & 18 GEo. 5, c. 21.
25. E.g., Fortescue v. Bradshaw, 27 T:L.R. 251 (K.B. 1911) (minimum of 220% per
annum, maximum of 1003% upon defauli ; Samuel v. Newbold, [1906] A.C. 461 (104%
per annum minimum, 418% on default).
26. E.g., Reading Trust, Ltd. v. Spero, [19301 1 K.B. 492; Carringtons, Ltd. v. Smith,
[1906] 1 K.B. 79.
27. Carringtons, Ltd. v. Smith, supra note 26, at 91 (dictum) ; Blair v. Buckworth, 24
T.L.R. 474 (C.A. 1908).
28. B. S. Lyle, Ltd. v. Pearson, [1941] 2 K.B. 391.
29. See, e.g., Gerde v. Kerman, 41 T.L.R. 597 (Ch. 1925) ; Stirling v. Musgrave, 29
T.L.R. 333 (K.B. 1912) ; King v. Barnett, 25 T.L.R. 52 (K.B. 1908).
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parently unreasonable interest rate, tend to convince a court that in the circum-
stances the rate is excessive and the loan harsh and unconscionable."
When a loan is found usurious, the court should have discretion to impose a
penalty commensurate with the flagrancy of the lender's conduct. However,
the forfeiture should not exceed approximately double the interest charged.
If there is no penalty, the borrower merely remitting all in excess of
reasonable interest, there is no deterrent effect. The lender has everything to
gain and nothing to lose by charging an excessive rate. On the other hand, a
fixed severe penalty would deter most courts from declaring any loans usu-
rious.3 1 The courts should have wide discretion in penalizing the usurious
lender in view of the difficulty of precise definition and application of a harsh
and unconscionable standard.
The enactment of a harsh and unconscionable test for usurious interest rates
might encourage a borrower to threaten litigation in order to force a com-
promise of a fair though expensive obligation. If the lender resisted this
threat, allegations of usury would in most cases warrant a trial of the issue
with attendant delay and expense. But this has not been a serious problem in
England. It seems probable that the discretion of English courts to in-
clude attorney's fees in assessing costs has been the major factor in
preventing such an abuse.3 2  This weapon should be made available to
courts in administering the suggested statute, and there is American prece-
dent for such a provision. The insurance laws of several states allow courts
to award attorney's fees to a claimant vexatiously forced to trial by the
insurer.3 3 Such a provision might best be implemented by requiring a bond
for all costs of trial.
The basic question is whether, in view of the expansion of consumer loan
legislation, sufficient need for protection of other borrowers exists to warrant
legislation which to some extent at least may cause uncertainty and encourage
"strike" suits. It is submitted that a statute such as the one proposed would, in
conjunction with comprehensive consumer loan legislation, give full protection
to borrowers without undue interference with a free and flexible flow of credit.
However, individual state legislatures, sensitive to the political overtones of
debtors' problems, are not likely to repeal or modify the present statutes.
The best hope for reform in the foreseeable future is the promulgation
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws of a
uniform law incorporating the suggested provisions.
30. E.g., Lewis v. Mills, 30 T.L.R. 438 (K.B. 1914) (playing upon fears of the bor-
rower); Stirling v. Rose, 30 T.L.R. 67 (K.B. 1913) (default clause not explained or
understood by the borrower) ; Bonnard v. Dott, 21 T.L.R. 491 (Ch. 1905) (helplessness or
folly of the borrower known to the lender).
31. The harsh forfeiture provisions of all early usury laws and many of the modern
statutes led to judicial evisceration of these laws by restrictive definition of the terms "loan"
and "interest." See Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927) ; Yeager
v. Ainsworth, 202 Miss. 747, 32 So. 2d 548 (1947) ; Note, 4 S.C.L.Q. 290 (1951). See also
authorities cited note 5 supra.
32. Cf. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929).
33. See VANcE, INSURAxcE § 5 (3d ed. 1951).
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